Supporters of the US and Israeli military campaign against Iran argue that weakening Tehran by degrading its missile capabilities, crippling its navy and reducing its ability to project power through regional allies will make the Middle East safer. But this strategy is based on the assumption that a weaker Iran would produce a more stable region. In reality, destabilizing one of the largest and most strategically important states in the Middle East could unleash forces far more dangerous than the status quo.
According to reports provided to congressional staff in Washington, D.C., there was no intelligence information to suggest that Iran was planning to attack the United States. However, military escalation continues in the belief that weakening Iran will ultimately benefit American interests. If that assumption proves wrong, the consequences could be serious not only for the region but also for American strategic interests.
The first danger is internal fragmentation. Iran’s population is ethnically diverse. While Persians make up the majority, the country is also home to large Azeri, Kurdish, Arab, and Baluchi communities, among others. Several of these groups already have a history of political tension or insurgency, including Kurdish militant activity in the northwest and a long-running Baluchi insurgency in the southeast.
A strong central state has largely kept these fault lines contained. But if Iran’s governing structures weaken significantly, those tensions could intensify. The result could resemble the fragmentation seen in other Middle Eastern states following external military pressure or regime collapse.
Recent history offers instructive examples. In Iraq, the dismantling of state institutions after the 2003 US invasion created the conditions for years of sectarian violence and, ultimately, the rise of ISIL (ISIS). The collapse of the Libyan state in 2011 left the country divided between rival governments and armed militias, a crisis that persists more than a decade later. Syria’s civil war produced one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes of the century and turned large swathes of territory into battlegrounds for militias and extremist groups. At the height of the conflict, ISIS was able to seize and rule territory throughout eastern Syria, declaring a so-called caliphate that controlled millions of people.
The collapse of Iran would produce an even more dangerous scenario. Its population is much larger than that of Iraq, Libya or Syria, and its territory borders multiple conflict-prone regions. The emergence of armed factions, ethnic militias or insurgent groups within Iran could quickly transform the country into another theater of prolonged instability.
That instability would not be local. Iran is located in the heart of the Gulf, one of the most strategically important energy corridors in the world. About a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes through the Strait of Hormuz, along Iran’s southern coast. Armed factions, rival militias or uncontrolled naval forces operating along Iran’s coast could disrupt shipping lanes, attack oil tankers or attempt to block access to the strait, turning a regional crisis into a global energy shock. That would have consequences far beyond the Middle East. Higher energy prices would ripple through global economies, affecting everything from transportation costs to inflation. American policymakers often view energy instability as a regional problem, but in reality it is quickly becoming a global problem.
The strategic consequences would extend even further. Today, Iran serves as a central node in a network of regional alliances and proxy groups that includes Hezbollah in Lebanon, various militia groups in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. These actors operate within a framework influenced, to varying degrees, by Tehran. If the Iranian state weakens dramatically, that structure could fragment. Some groups could operate independently, others could compete for influence, and others could become even more radicalized without central coordination. The result would be a much more unpredictable security environment across the Middle East, making diplomatic engagement more difficult and military conflicts more difficult to contain.
Another risk lies in leadership uncertainty. Some officials assume that weakening the current Iranian leadership will produce a more moderate political order. But regime change rarely follows a predictable script.
Iran’s political system contains multiple competing factions, including conservative clerical networks, reformist politicians, and powerful elements within the security establishment, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Iran’s leadership transition is less about a single successor than about the balance of power between clerical institutions, elected officials and the security apparatus. If existing leadership were weakened or eliminated during wartime conditions, that balance could quickly crumble. The IRGC, which already has vast military and economic resources, could attempt to consolidate its authority, potentially pushing Iran toward a more overtly militarized political order. In such an environment, more radical actors, particularly those who consider reaching an agreement with the United States impossible, could gain influence.
There is also little evidence that sustained military strikes generate pro-American sentiment among the Iranian population. History suggests that external pressure often strengthens nationalist sentiment rather than weakening it. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, for example, did not generate pro-American attitudes, but instead fueled resentment and insurgency. Similarly, repeated Israeli military campaigns in Lebanon have tended to strengthen support for Hezbollah rather than weaken it.
Beyond the Middle East itself, instability in Iran could also trigger significant migration flows. Iran already hosts millions of refugees from neighboring countries, particularly Afghanistan. If internal conflict were to break out within Iran, even a small proportion of Iran’s population of more than 90 million seeking refuge abroad could produce much larger migration flows than those seen during recent Middle East crises.
Many of those migrants would likely move toward Turkiye and eventually Europe, putting additional pressure on governments already facing migration crises. While this may seem distant from American shores, the political consequences for America’s allies in Europe would inevitably affect transatlantic relations and Western cohesion.
Together, these risks illustrate a broader strategic problem. Weakening Iran may seem attractive to the United States from a narrow military perspective, but destabilizing a major regional power rarely produces tidy results.
The United States has faced similar dynamics before. The collapse of state authority in Iraq after 2003 did not eliminate threats in the region; produced new ones. The fragmentation of Libya after 2011 created a lasting security vacuum. The Syrian civil war became a multilateral conflict that reshaped the politics of the entire region.
For Washington, the question should be whether the long-term consequences of destabilizing Iran will ultimately make the region and the world more dangerous. If recent history offers any guidance, destabilizing Iran may ultimately create the very threats Washington hopes to eliminate.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera.
