America and Israel have been waging war on Iran for almost two weeks. What Washington initially presented as a military operation that would quickly shift the strategic balance and put Tehran in a vulnerable position has proven to be more complex. In recent months, the White House has maintained that Iran could be on the brink of total defeat by the end of the first or at most the second day of the conflict. Clearly, the American side expected a rapid dismantling of Iran’s capabilities and serious destabilization of its government. However, recent developments tell a different story.
How Iran Holds Up
Despite immense pressure, Iran showed no signs of systemic collapse and managed to maintain the operation of key state institutions, military infrastructure and governance mechanisms. Furthermore, the current situation suggests that Washington’s initial calculations were overly optimistic and failed to take into account several fundamental factors that underpin Iran’s resilience. This resilience is especially remarkable considering the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on the first day of the war.
The US felt that the Iranian regime was severely weakened and would collapse like a house of cards under a significant blow. According to this logic, eliminating a supreme leader triggers a chain reaction: elites lose coordination, institutions become dysfunctional, and the state structure rapidly disintegrates. This scenario was thought to resemble the events of 2003 in Iraq, where the destruction of central authority led to the rapid disintegration of state institutions and a prolonged period of systemic crisis.
Yet, events in Iran reveal a fundamentally different picture. State institutions will continue to function. Key government institutions are active, decision-making processes are functioning and the system is not out of control. This suggests that the political framework of the Islamic Republic depends not only on individual leadership but also on a robust institutional architecture capable of ensuring stability in the midst of conflict.
Furthermore, the Assembly of Experts – the deliberative body responsible for choosing the Supreme Leader – appointed Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as the new Supreme Leader. It refers to the stable operation of the institutional continuum of power.
Today, Iran is facing another stress test in its modern history. The country’s political system has faced serious challenges before – from the devastating Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s to decades of sanctions, international isolation and regional crises. Each of these periods tested the durability of the institutional framework established after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. This model combines religio-political legitimacy with a robust security apparatus and a sufficiently flexible governance structure that allows it to adapt to external pressures.
The current crisis serves as another test of the structure’s resilience. As events unfold, it is becoming clear that America’s expectations of quickly achieving its strategic objectives are misplaced. The US faces many challenges that appear to have been underestimated in its initial plans to pressure Iran. If this crisis is resolved without any major upheaval, it further shows that the state model created after the Islamic revolution is very resilient. Moreover, these kinds of experiments often lead to the opposite effect in the long run, strengthening internal unity and enhancing the political system.
Many of these points are obvious to countries with extensive experience dealing with Iran. For example, Russia and China, which maintain close political and economic ties with Tehran, understand the nuances of Iran’s political system, its ability to mobilize in the face of external threats, and its high level of institutional stability. That is why experts in these countries have a more measured and realistic view of the prospects of coercive pressure on Iran.
What is Washington’s miscalculation?
The rhetoric of American leadership leads us to another important observation. A closer look at Trump’s statements — both his social media posts and public speeches — reveals a sense of significant political and emotional turmoil in his administration. First, the inconsistency of the statements made by the White House stands out. Since the beginning of the conflict, we have seen sharp changes in US rhetoric. Initially, US officials announced that the strategic objective of the pressure campaign against Iran was regime change. Later statements indicated that only attention “Militarization” and the limitation of Iran’s military capabilities. This followed fresh hints about the need to transform Iran’s political system. Later, the rhetoric shifted toward emotional outbursts and insulting criticism directed at the nation and its political framework, as well as specific members of the Iranian leadership.
This evolving discourse creates a palpable sense of uncertainty. And it’s not just about Trump. A similar inconsistency can be seen in the statements of key officials in his administration. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth have repeatedly delivered conflicting messages over the past week: first asserting a position, then adjusting the words, only to later present starkly different interpretations of America’s intentions in Iran. These constant shifts in rhetoric inevitably give the impression of a lack of clear strategy. The more Trump insists that the situation is successfully developing and fully under control, the greater the discrepancy between this narrative and reality.
A telling example is Trump’s attempt to draw parallels between Iran and Venezuela. This comparison fails under scrutiny, as these countries have fundamentally different political structures. Apparently, the White House hopes to apply a similar approach to Tehran, following what it perceived as a successful strategy in the case of the kidnapping of Nicolas Maduro. The assumption was that by creating external pressure and supporting internal instability, a quick collapse of the regime could be achieved. However, this thinking reveals a significant misunderstanding of Iranian statehood. If these miscalculations form the basis of American expectations, the consequences for US policy in the Middle East could be severe.
Despite threats from the US and Israel about potential strikes against the country’s leadership, Iranian elites show no signs of panic or political paralysis. Equally important is the broader strategic context. Over decades of pressure on Iran, the US has used every tool of external influence: sweeping sanctions, diplomatic isolation, attempts to exploit ethnic tensions, and attempts to launch a color revolution. None of these tactics yielded the results Washington had hoped for.
In this context, the current aggression cannot be seen as a display of US power and dominance, but rather as an indication of American weakness. When economic, political and informational instruments fail to achieve the desired results, military action becomes a last resort. In other words, the ongoing offensive against Iran looks less like a show of confidence and more like a sign that the old model of US global hegemony is facing significant limits. As these constraints become more apparent, the rhetoric of the US leadership grows more anxious and confrontational.
Clearly, Washington’s initial expectations for a rapid weakening of Iran are not materializing. Rather, the current situation indicates that the Islamic Republic is undergoing a serious trial and is poised to demonstrate its resilience in the face of external aggression.
