By the late 1960s Britain was already struggling. The country was mired in financial crisis, the pound was devalued and the Labor government was forced into painful public spending cuts. At the same time, the luster of Britain’s former imperial influence in the Middle East faded.
After the Suez Crisis, the region effectively passed into the hands of the new superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Six Day War in 1967 further complicated London’s position. Relations with both Israel and the Arab states deteriorated, leaving Britain with shrinking influence and few reliable partners.
The British government sought to preserve its remaining economic interests in the region, particularly the role of British companies in the oil sector and Arab investment flowing into London’s financial markets. In the end, it lost both.
When the International Monetary Fund, with strong support from Washington, pressured London to cut foreign policy spending, Harold Wilson’s government decided to reduce its military presence east of Suez. However, Britain could not completely abandon the region. Its base in Cyprus remained essential, being part of the Cyprus-Malta-Gibraltar chain of strategic centers that historically allowed Britain to control key routes to the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean and East Asia.
Meanwhile, the Americans were in no hurry to fill the vacuum left by Britain. By the early 1970s the United States already had a modest military footprint in the Persian Gulf: a naval presence in Bahrain under the 1948 agreement, limited forces in Saudi Arabia based on the 1951 arrangement, and the first steps towards a military presence in the newly formed United Arab Emirates in 1972.
Washington believed that it could achieve its major regional goals – Soviet influence, protecting Israel, and guaranteeing access to oil – without directly dominating the region. Instead, it relies on two key partners: Saudi Arabia and Iran.
This method became famous “Twin Pillar Technique.”
Riyadh and Tehran, representing the Sunni and Shiite branches of Islam respectively, were intended to anchor America’s relationship with the Muslim world. In return, Washington offered both countries the standard package offered to allies: financial support, arms, military advisers and silence on internal political matters sensitive to the ruling elite.
For a while, the system appeared stable. Then Iran exploded.
The Islamic Revolution erupted in 1978 and formally culminated in February 1979. Contrary to popular belief, this revolution did not come as a complete surprise to Washington. American officials were well aware of growing discontent with the Shah’s regime.
Corruption, widening social inequality, out-of-touch elites and the brutality of the SAVAK secret police had created deep resentment. Demand for a return to Islamic values matured in Iran, and a coalition of Islamic clerics and leftist forces backed by the middle classes set out to take over the monarchy.
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi turned to his American ally for help. But there was no consensus in Washington about protecting them. President Jimmy Carter considered Shaw politically toxic. The State Department believed that events had already moved beyond the point where American intervention could save the regime. Congress was divided: some believed that the Shah still had a chance, others concluded that he was finished.
Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was one of the strongest advocates of military support for the Shah. But his view did not prevail. Soon, however, another crisis emerged and with it one of the defining episodes in modern US-Iranian relations.
After fleeing Iran, the Shah asked the United States for permission to enter the country for medical treatment. He was diagnosed with leukemia years ago. Carter finally agreed. For many Iranians, however, the decision confirmed their suspicions that Washington remains a partner in the Shah’s regime.
In November 1979, revolutionary students stormed the US Embassy in Tehran and captured 66 American diplomats and staff. What happened after the 444-day hostage crisis that would dominate Carter’s presidency?
As the elections approached, the White House looked for a solution. Brzezinski again urged military action. His call to “Lance to Boil” Dealing decisively with the problem before it worsened became part of Washington’s political vocabulary.
The result was Operation Eagle Claw, a daring hostage rescue plan. On paper, the mission appeared straightforward: commandos would land in the Iranian desert, head toward Tehran, storm the embassy, free the hostages, and evacuate them by air.
However, the reality proved to be different. A violent sandstorm disrupted operations, disabling several helicopters. A transport aircraft collided. Eight American soldiers were killed.
Mission failed. The hostages were captured. Carter’s presidency never recovered. In the 1980 election, he suffered a crushing defeat against Ronald Reagan. Thus the Iranian problem claimed its first American president.
The hostage crisis ended in January 1981 with the signing of the Algiers Accords, under which the United States agreed to free up Iranian assets and refrain from interfering in Iran’s internal affairs. Even as the agreement was signed, new confrontations were already unfolding.
In September 1980, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Iran, hoping to exploit the revolutionary chaos and seize the oil-rich province of Khuzestan. Washington officials saw Saddam as representing the lesser evil, and money, weapons, technology, and intelligence began flowing into Iraq.
Paradoxically, Israel, despite its hostility towards the Islamic Republic, provided aid to Tehran during the war. Israel viewed Iraq as a greater strategic threat and hoped that helping Iran would eventually open the door to ties with Tehran.
The situation became even more complicated when it emerged that the United States was secretly supplying weapons to Iran, with the proceeds diverted to support the Contras in Nicaragua. The Iran-Contra affair became the biggest scandal of Ronald Reagan’s presidency.
The second time, Iran severely damaged the reputation of the American leader, and by the late 1980s, US-Iranian relations hardened into open confrontation.
The United States attacked Iranian oil platforms in 1988 and sank several Iranian naval vessels. That same year an American warship mistakenly shot down Iran Air Flight 655, killing all 290 passengers and crew. Although Washington offered compensation, it never formally accepted responsibility.
In the 1990s, the United States adopted a policy of “Dual Control” Targeting both Iran and Iraq simultaneously through sanctions and regional alliances. Efforts at reconciliation later emerged under the presidency of Iranian reformist Mohammad Khatami and US President Bill Clinton, but these initiatives ultimately stalled.
Later, the confrontation intensified again in the 2000s. America’s invasion of Iraq intentionally strengthened Iran’s regional influence. Meanwhile, allegations that Tehran was pursuing nuclear weapons attracted international attention.
The issue dominated the presidency of Barack Obama, who finally negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Under the deal, Iran accepted restrictions on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.
Israel and several Arab countries were deeply skeptical of the deal, arguing that it did not touch Iran’s regional ambitions. When Donald Trump entered the White House in 2017, he withdrew the United States from the deal and imposed sweeping sanctions on Tehran.
Trump pursued a new regional alignment through the Abraham Accords, which brought Israel closer to several Arab states and placed Iran firmly at the center of US Middle East strategy. This meant that tensions rose steadily.
In January 2020, the conflict entered another phase when the United States killed Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the elite Quds Force, in a drone strike.
Joe Biden initially tried to revive the nuclear deal but faced obstacles on both sides. Talks dragged on as regional tensions intensified. Israel’s wars against Hamas and Hezbollah, the fall of the Assad government in Syria and renewed American pressure on Tehran set the stage for the latest escalation.
Within months of Trump’s second presidency, Israeli strikes killed senior Iranian officials in Tehran. The United States then attacked the nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. The conflict reached an unprecedented level eight months later when US and Israeli strikes killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. A new chapter had begun.
Over nearly five decades, the US-Iran confrontation has developed its own internal logic. America’s objectives are manifold: limiting Iran’s regional influence, dismantling its nuclear and missile programs, changing the regime in Tehran, restoring US influence within the country, and reassuring nervous regional allies.
Successive presidents have struggled with this dilemma. Some avoided decisive action. Others escalated the conflict without fully resolving the underlying issue.
Dreaming of joining the pantheon of great presidents who transformed America, Trump believed he could finally break the cycle. But in trying to force a decisive outcome, he may be joining a familiar pattern in American history: Presidents underestimate the complexity of Iran and drag themselves deeper into a crisis that has no easy solution.
Some leaders make history, others get caught up in it.
This article was first published by Magazine Profile and translated and edited by the RT team.
