US-Israeli attacks on Iran threaten China’s energy security

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on Sunday condemned the US and Israeli attacks on Iran, calling the “unconscionable assassination of a sovereign leader” and attempts to incite regime change “unacceptable” and called for an immediate ceasefire and a return to talks to prevent wider regional conflict.

China has long been an important ally of Iran. buys about 90% of its crude oil and providing financial and technical support. Recent US-Israeli strikes, which disrupted key installations and killed senior figures including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, put Beijing in a sensitive position: He refuses to get involved In the Middle East firestorm, its energy security is at stake.

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Shipping routes are used through the Strait of Hormuz China imports half of its oil From the Gulf, underscoring the vulnerability of Beijing’s energy imports, have been disrupted. Iran cannot easily replace partner Beijing, especially given the concessions it secures through sanctions-driven arrangements.

The offensive also reveals the limits of China’s influence in the region. While Beijing can offer economic and diplomatic support, it cannot guarantee its allies military protection, forcing it to carefully calibrate its response to avoid conflict with Washington.

ChinaMed Project Research Fellow Theo Nencini, a PhD candidate specializing in Iran-China relations and China’s Middle East foreign policy, describes the constraints and priorities driving Beijing’s strategic calculus amid the crisis.

How dependent is China on Iranian oil and how is it used?

China’s dependence on Iranian oil is significant but not overwhelming. We are talking about 12 to 15% of Chinese oil supply from Iran. That fluctuates, but on average, it has been around 1.5 million barrels per day since spring 2023. For context, before that, since 2019, Iran has rarely supplied more than 700,000 barrels per day. The increase in April 2023 essentially doubled imports.

A major driver is the Iran-Saudi rapprochement in Beijing in March 2023. After the two sides normalized relations, Iranian exports to China increased sharply and remained relatively stable, hovering between 1.2 and 1.9 million barrels per day, depending on seasonal and market factors.

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Most of this crude oil is loaded at Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf, which handles 90% of Iranian shipments. The tankers then pass through the Strait of Hormuz and head for Southeast Asia. Usually, they anchor off the coast of Malaysia or in the South China Sea, where there is a so-called “ship-to-ship transfer”. This is an important method to obfuscate the source of oil. After these transfers, the crude oil, often renamed Malaysian, Omani or Emirati, is finally unloaded in China, particularly along the Shandong coast, where independent refineries – known as “teapots” – operate.

These teapots are relatively immune to US sanctions, as they have no assets in the US and are specifically configured to process Iranian crude. It is important to understand that Beijing does not directly orchestrate this – the market is largely self-regulating. Iran applies concessions ranging from 6 to 10%, sometimes more, to compensate for the difficulties associated with sanctions. Over several years, this would cost Tehran a third of what it would have earned at market prices.

At this time, China is not in immediate danger of supply disruption. There are 40 to 45 million barrels in floating storage, so in the coming weeks, the country will be covered. But the real vulnerability lies in the Strait of Hormuz: about 45% of China’s oil imports pass through this chokepoint, and it is a long-standing strategic concern.

China imports other petrochemical products like methanol from Iran. While exact figures vary, reports indicate that Iran supplies significant portions of Asian methanol markets. This is relevant because methanol feeds the plastics and industrial chemicals that China relies on for production. However, volumes are still smaller than crude oil imports and fluctuate with market dynamics and prices.

Why does China condemn? How will attacks on Iran and its ideology shape its response?

China has always condemned attacks on Iran. This is not new. Beijing also issued condemnation statements when Israel bombed the Iranian consulate annex in Damascus.

It said China often acted with caution and delay. For example, in June last year, it waited nearly 48 hours before responding to a major strike, ostensibly assessing whether the Iranian regime could withstand the situation. That delay did not sit well with Tehran.

China’s foreign policy is grounded in the notion of absolute national sovereignty. Any kind of intervention in another state, particularly military or regime-change operations, is fundamentally incompatible with their ideology. This explains why China’s public statements are strong in principle but limited in actual engagement.

In the Middle East, China has two clear priorities. The first is energy security – ensuring the uninterrupted flow of oil, particularly through the Strait of Hormuz, is crucial for China’s consumption. The second is regional stability, which relates not only to power but also to the potential resurgence of radical Islamism. Although jihadist activity has declined compared to the 2000-2020 period, unrest has erupted quickly. China remains sensitive because of past problems in Xinjiang and potential spillovers to Central Asia or Pakistan, where Chinese nationals are vulnerable to attacks.

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If Iran is forced into an existential struggle, an asymmetric response, including indirect or proxy actions, may be possible, but this remains unpredictable. Chinese doctrine puts it in a wait-and-see posture, avoiding direct involvement unless absolutely necessary.

This is China-Iran cooperation A tactical military?

On paper, China-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership has been signed in 2021. But in practice, this partnership is not fully structured or systematic. It is mostly additive, zonal and temporary. Despite announcements of $400 billion in Chinese investment, most of these projects have not materialized in scale.

There are proposed infrastructure projects: railway upgrades, port upgrades and some works in the Chabahar/Makran region. Militarily, China supplied Iran with anti-ship missiles and industrial know-how between 1985 and 1997. But since 2010, verifiable cooperation has been limited. Some Chinese units may access Iranian missile production, and Iran participates in naval exercises with (mutual ally) Russia. Iranian use of China’s Beidou satellite navigation system is also plausible but difficult to verify.

So the relationship is pragmatic and real, but constrained by US sanctions. Iran has significant geographic potential, an educated workforce and industrial capacity, but systematic collaboration with China remains fragmented.

Overall, China’s cooperation with Iran has been tactical rather than strategic, focusing on energy, selective infrastructure, and limited military coordination — all while being careful not to violate sanctions or escalate tensions.