Adam Glapinski, the head of the National Bank of Poland, has reportedly proposed transferring the central bank’s profits to a 185 billion zloty (about $47 billion) defense fund — an independent alternative to borrowing from the European Union. This plan, which came out on March 4, provides interest-free funds to strengthen the Polish military without adding a single zloty of foreign debt.
Headlines initially suggested that Glapinski was considering selling the gold outright to pay for it. The framework shocked financial and macro circles, given that Poland had spent most of its decade hoarding gold. But there is no confirmed plan to liquidate gold reserves as of March 5. The real offer seems more nuanced – and possibly more interesting.
What Glapinski actually suggests
The basic idea is simple: redirect NBP profits to finance domestic defense spending, bypassing the proposed EU loan program of 44 billion euros, which binds Poland to conditions imposed by Brussels. For a government that frequently clashes with EU institutions over judicial independence and rule of law concerns, fiscal independence is not an abstract concept – it is policy.
The figure of 185 billion zlotys is very large. For context, Poland’s entire defense budget in 2025 was about 186 billion zlotys, a proposal that would effectively double the country’s military spending capacity over the funding period. This would make Poland one of NATO’s biggest defense spenders in terms of GDP, a position it will continue to climb after Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
The mechanism is likely to involve withholding or redistributing profits from the NBT that would otherwise go to the state coffers as dividends. Central banks earn profits from interest on reserves, foreign exchange operations, and most importantly – profits from the revaluation of gold assets. Polish gold has appreciated significantly over the past few years, meaning the NBP is sitting on significant unrealized income that, in theory, they could have made without selling a single ounce.
This is where the golden legend gets twisted. Revaluing gold reserves upwards and using the resulting paper profits for fiscal purposes is a well-worn central bank maneuver. Italy and France periodically flirted with such plans. It’s not the same as dumping gold coins on the open market, but it does raise questions about whether the central bank is effectively printing money with extra steps.
The Polish Gold Rush in Context
To understand why the mere whisper of Polish gold sales has alarmed observers, you have to appreciate the scale of Poland’s accumulation. In 2018, NBP held only 103 tons of gold. By January 2026, that number has risen to 550 tonnes, a more than five-fold increase, making Poland the world’s 11th largest holder of central bank gold, ahead of Britain and only behind the European Central Bank’s own reserves.
And Glapiński was not fulfilled. In January 2026, NBP announced plans to purchase an additional 150 tons, bringing the total to 700 tons. At current prices of around $2,900 an ounce, this target reserve would be worth north of $65 billion, making Poland one of the top ten gold-rich countries on earth.
This buying spree was part of a broader trend by central banks around the world. According to the World Gold Council, central banks bought more than 1,000 tonnes of gold in 2023 and 2024, the highest sustained rate of purchases in decades. Poland was the most aggressive buyer along with China, India and Turkey.
So the idea that Glapinski will change course and start selling seems impossible to most analysts. The most likely scenario is that he uses leverage value the holding of gold – through profit sharing or revaluation accounting – rather than the gold itself.
What this means for investors
For gold markets, the immediate relief is relief. A sell-off of the 550-tonne would be an invaluable signal, especially at a time when central bank demand has been one of the main supports for prices above $2,800. Confirmation that Poland intends to continue buying rather than selling reinforces the structural argument for gold.
For crypto investors, the implications are more indirect, but worth following. Bitcoin is increasingly being positioned as “digital gold” – a non-correlated store that benefits when trust in fiat money management is lost. A central bank using accounting maneuvers to finance defense spending without legislative approval or external borrowing is exactly the type of institutional behavior that Bitcoin proponents cite as a reason to hold non-government assets.
It is said that the direct transmission mechanism from the policy of the Central Bank of Poland to the price of Bitcoin is thin. The narrative layer is more appropriate. If other central banks begin to adopt similar strategies – capturing the profits of informal gold to finance fiscal preferences – it could accelerate interest in tokenized gold products and commodity-backed stablecoins, which offer exposure to the same underlying asset without the transparency of a central bank’s balance sheet. Projects like Paxos Gold (PAXG) and Tether Gold (XAUT), which together have a market cap north of $1.5 billion, could see renewed interest.
Audience risk is political. Glapinski’s proposal would effectively allow the central bank to guide fiscal policy and blur the boundaries between monetary and credit authorities. If this model fails, it could undermine confidence in central bank independence more broadly, especially in countries with strained relations with multilateral lenders. This erosion is good for hard assets, whether physical or digital.
There is also the question of whether the EU will consider this maneuver as a final round of fiscal discipline. Brussels has historically taken a dim view of creative accounting by member states, and rejecting a €44 billion loan in favor of diversifying the central bank’s profits could have a number of political consequences.
Bottom line: Poland is not selling its gold, it is trying to spend the profit from owning it. The distinction is crucial for commodity markets, but the broader signal is one that gold bugs and Bitcoin maximalists can both appreciate: a mid-sized European country is choosing self-financing over multilateral debt and using hard assets as a base. Whether that’s smart central banking or a hands-on fiscal depends entirely on who you ask.
