The war with Iran continues to expand. However, no matter how and when it ends, one thing has become clear during its tumultuous early days: the emergence of Israel as a regional superpower determined to redraw the politics – and the map – of a transformed Middle East.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s confidence in being able to do so is not based solely on Israel’s military, technological and intelligence advantage over its neighbors.
It is due to another transformation: President Donald Trump’s break with previous administrations’ efforts to influence and sometimes constrain Israeli policy, and his elevation of the US security alliance with Israel to something much closer to a full military partnership.
Why do we write this?
The US and Israeli airstrikes against Iran have escalated into a broader regional conflict that will change the political dynamics of the Middle East. But it is still unclear who drove the decision to attack and what the vision is for a post-war Middle East.
The depth of that partnership was underscored by the opening attack of the war against Iran: the joint Israeli-American strike on Tehran on Saturday that killed Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In fact, Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested this week that the timing of the war had been dictated by Israel, which he said had decided to attack Iran on its own.
Still, just as the war has affected other countries, Netanyahu’s vision of a postwar Middle East could face obstacles once the bombs and missiles finally stop working.
His vision is clear. Presiding over the most right-wing government in Israel’s history, he has expanded his country’s “security” borders in recent months by taking control of an area inside Syria and tightening Israel’s control over Gaza.
This week, it moved to reassert military control over parts of southern Lebanon in response to missile launches by Iran’s ally Hezbollah.
The prime minister is also determined to quash any possibility of a Palestinian state and press ahead with the de facto annexation of the West Bank as a permanent part of Israel.
And he predicts that key Arab Gulf states, most notably Saudi Arabia, will move quickly to establish normal ties with Israel once the war has weakened Iran beyond recognition.
However, there are potential obstacles.
An example: Saudi Arabia and the other Arab oil states in the Gulf region.
Its leaders had urged Trump to seek a negotiated settlement with Tehran and avoid war, fearing, rightly, that Iran would respond by firing missiles and drones not only at Israel but also at their countries.
They are deeply uncomfortable with the prospect of Israel exercising unfettered regional dominance. This is especially true after the devastation in Gaza caused by Israel’s response to Hamas’ cross-border murder and abduction of hundreds of civilians in October 2023, as well as Netanyahu’s dismissal of the idea of a two-state peace with the Palestinians.
And while the Gulf States are no match for Israel militarily, they can make their voices heard. They have their own political, military and, above all, economic ties with Washington.
However, the key imponderable could be Trump himself.
The alliance between the United States and Israel has a long history, supported by ties between the military and security sectors of both countries and, since the late 1970s, by nearly $4 billion in annual US aid.
However, last year’s unprecedented level of support and partnership has its roots in the relationship between Netanyahu and Trump. They have been united politically by a shared strongman approach to domestic politics and a muscular, “great power” view of the world.
The administration’s recent National Defense Strategy called Israel a “model ally.” She had shown herself to be “able and willing to defend herself” and needed to be empowered, not restrained.
But, especially with the Iran war expanding unpredictably, Netanyahu’s ability to set the terms for a postwar Middle East could stumble if his and Trump’s political interests diverge.
Both leaders face electoral tests in the coming months: midterm elections in the United States and an Israeli parliamentary election that will determine whether Netanyahu remains in office.
No matter how the war ends, the Israeli leader can claim to have vindicated his decades-long insistence on the need to confront the theocratic regime in Tehran. It has also garnered the highest level of support from Israel’s critical ally, the United States, in the alliance’s history.
That’s a stroke of political luck. He hopes it will quash many voters’ anger over his government’s inability to foresee, prevent or respond quickly to the Hamas attack two and a half years ago.
However, Trump’s calculation could depend on the course of the conflict with Iran, especially if market turbulence and increases in oil and gas prices persist, there is no political exit ramp in sight, and his political opponents raise the specter of a “forever war.”
He could then retreat or pivot toward the more politically acceptable endgame that both he and Netanyahu cited at the start of hostilities: a broader regional peace.
That would mean moving forward with the stalled implementation of his 20-point plan for the reconstruction of Gaza. And it could mean expanding the main foreign policy achievement of Trump’s first term, the Abraham Accords normalization deal between Israel and several Arab states.
The problem for Netanyahu?
Both initiatives would require the acceptance of the most influential Arab state in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia.
And the Saudis seem confident in insisting, at the very least, on Netanyahu’s commitment to keeping the path open to an eventual two-state peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
And that could pit President Trump’s vision for the Middle East against that of his model ally.
