The United States-Israeli war over Iran is only a day old, and it is already clear that it will have a profound impact on the Middle East and the Gulf in particular. US-Israeli bombing of Iran kills several high-ranking officials and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Tehran has responded by attacking not only Israel but various countries in the region.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman were hit by Iranian missiles or drones, even though none of these countries attacked Iran from their territory. Various sites across these states were targeted, including US military bases, airports, ports and commercial areas.
If the conflict drags on, it could be a real turning point for the Gulf — one that will reshape how states think about security, alliances and their long-term economic futures.
For years, Gulf stability has rested on familiar assumptions: the United States remains the dominant security guarantor; The rivalry with Iran was managed, contained and kept below the threshold of full confrontation; And the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – despite its differences – has provided enough coordination to prevent regional politics from unraveling completely. An ongoing conflict involving the US, Israel and Iran will bring everything down at once. This will push the Gulf capitals to reconsider not only their defense planning but also the deeper logic of their regional strategy.
In recent years, Gulf diplomacy has already been changing – cautiously, quietly and with a strong preference for hedging rather than choosing sides. The Saudi-Iran thaw from China in 2023, the UAE’s experimental channels with Tehran, and Oman’s stable mediating role point to the same idea: stability requires dialogue even when mistrust runs deep. Qatar has also opened the door, betting on diplomacy and de-escalation as a way to reduce risk.
But a prolonged war makes that balancing act more difficult to maintain. Pressure will mount from Washington to show clear alignment. Domestic opinion demands firm answers about where national interests really stand. Regional polarization intensifies. In that kind of environment, strategic ambivalence stops looking like smart flexibility and starts looking like vulnerability because everyone wants you to pick a side.
Economic shock waves can be just as significant. Any extended conflict involving Iran would immediately put maritime chokepoints at the center of global attention, particularly the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world economy’s most sensitive arteries. Even limited disruptions could trigger sharp energy price increases, higher insurance and shipping costs, and renewed investor anxiety.
Yes, higher oil prices can boost returns in the short term, but continued volatility has a different cost. That could scare away long-term capital, complicate megaproject financing and raise borrowing costs at a time when many Gulf states are trying to accelerate diversification.
There is also a long-term strategic risk. Major consumers, particularly in Asia, may decide that repeated instability is reason enough to accelerate diversification away from Gulf energy resources. Over time, it will quietly reduce the region’s leverage, even if it remains a major energy supplier.
Within the GCC, war can push states closer together or expose fissures. A faction always moves between unity and rivalry, and crisis does not automatically produce unity. Different members have different threat perceptions and different comfort levels with risk. Oman and Qatar generally respect mediation and communication channels with Tehran. Although Saudi Arabia and the UAE have recently invested in de-escalation, they have tended more toward prevention. Kuwait carefully balances and avoids a hard position.
If conflict escalates unexpectedly, those differences can resurface and undermine reconciliation. But the opposite result is also possible. The crisis could result in deeper cooperation on missile defense, intelligence sharing and maritime security. Which direction the GCC takes depends less on outside pressure and more on whether member states see this as a moment to compete or a moment to close ranks.
Zooming out, the protracted war will catalyze larger geopolitical realignments. China and Russia will not remain passive. Beijing, deeply invested in Gulf energy flows and regional connectivity, could expand its diplomatic footprint and appear as a stabilizing broker. Moscow could use the turmoil to boost arms sales and control regional divisions.
Meanwhile, if US military engagement deepens but Washington’s political bandwidth narrows, the Gulf states may find themselves in a complicated position – increasingly dependent on American security support and increasingly wary of relying on a single patron. That dynamic could produce a new model, one of conditional alignment, where Gulf capitals cooperate militarily with the US but expand their economic and diplomatic options to avoid overdependence.
Deep change should not be military or economic. It can be cultural in strategic terms. The Gulf states have spent decades prioritizing stability, modernization and cautious geopolitical strategies. Continued regional warfare could disrupt that model. This can force painful trade-offs between security needs and development ambitions, between diplomatic flexibility and alliance discipline, between the desire to avoid escalation and the reality of living alongside it.
That’s why it feels like the Gulf is standing at a crossroads. It could be the prelude to a protracted, great-power-induced confrontation — or it could leverage the diplomatic capital it has built up to escalate by strengthening its defensive resilience. Either way, the result does not shape Gulf security thinking. This could influence the entire political architecture of the region for years – possibly decades – to come.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera.
(tags to translate)Opinions
