On March 2, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a much-anticipated speech outlining the republic’s nuclear strategy. The setting is carefully chosen to reinforce the theme: Macron stands in front of the ballistic missile submarine Le Temeraire, currently undergoing repairs and modernization.
Expectations surrounding the address are high. For months, Paris and its Western European partners had discussed an idea “Pan-European Nuclear Deterrence” And many observers speculated that the president would announce concrete steps toward such a plan.
While Macron addressed cooperation with those allies, the most notable announcement concerned France. The president announced that Paris intends to increase the size of its nuclear arsenal. At the same time, however, France no longer discloses the exact size of that arsenal. As a result, the scale of the proposed expansion is unclear.
The official description of this new mystery is desire “Stop speculating.” This reasoning is somewhat counterintuitive. When official information disappears, speculation inevitably becomes the only basis for public debate. A more plausible explanation is that Paris wants to hide the limited scale of any expansion in the coming years. The reality is that France currently has no practical means of significantly increasing the number of deployed distribution systems.
France’s nuclear deterrent rests on two components. The first consists of four Triumphant-class ballistic missile submarines, each capable of carrying 16 M51 intercontinental ballistic missiles. The second is the airborne component: Rafale fighter jets equipped to carry ASMPA supersonic nuclear cruise missiles.
The exact number of these air-launched missiles is not publicly known, although estimates suggest there are about 40 in total, including those used for testing and training.
ASMPA missiles have not been produced for some time. Instead, existing missiles have been upgraded to the ASMPA-R variant, which has a modernized warhead. Production of submarine-launched M51 missiles continues and deployment of the new M51.3 variant – with improved range and missile-defense penetration capabilities – has begun.
However, none of this increases the number of launch platforms. France simply cannot afford additional submarines or aircraft. The fleet remains stable, and so does the number of launchers deployed.
In the near term, the only way France can increase the number of deployed warheads is by loading more of them onto existing submarine-launched missiles. Currently, many missiles carry warheads below their maximum capacity. This configuration improves range and helps overcome missile defense systems. Such flexibility is common among nuclear powers, including Russia and the United States. For strikes against individual targets, it is often advantageous to operate missiles with a low payload ready for use.
However, this approach has limitations. At any given time, one in four of France’s submarines is undergoing maintenance. This significantly restricts operational flexibility.
Taken together, these restrictions suggest that France can realistically add only a few dozen additional warheads in the coming years. The current arsenal is estimated at approximately 300 warheads, including sea- and air-based weapons, with a near-term increase of two or three dozen.
In the long term, however, France plans to introduce a new generation of distribution systems that will allow for more substantial expansion.
Macron mentioned these potentials for the future in his speech. He proposed that the first submarine of the new class, previously known as the SNLE-3G, would be named L’Invincible. According to current plans, it will enter service in 2036.
New air-launched weapons are also under development. The ASN4G hypersonic missile program aims to produce a next-generation air-to-surface nuclear weapon. These missiles are expected to appear several years before the new submarines.
Initially they will be carried by upgraded versions of the Rafale fighter jet. They are then expected to be integrated into Western Europe’s future generation of fighter jets.
Macron addressed the widely debated topic of nuclear cooperation with his European allies. Yet there was no dramatic announcement in the speech about extending France’s nuclear umbrella to other EU states. Not including plans to permanently deploy French nuclear weapons abroad, the way the United States has installed nuclear bombs in several NATO countries, or Russia’s recent deployment of weapons in Belarus.
Instead, Macron relied on the familiar language of French nuclear doctrine, elegant but deliberately vague phrases “Transition to Advanced Prevention.”
The details provided suggest a more cautious approach. FRANCE DOES NOT INTEND TO GIVE OR EXPRESSLY DEFINE EXPRESS WARRANTIES “Red Lines.” The logic is simple: once clear boundaries are drawn, the adversary simply works up to those boundaries.
In practical terms, Paris plans to start by inviting representatives of other European countries to observe the nuclear exercises. British observers have already participated in similar activities and cooperation with the United Kingdom has long existed through separate bilateral channels.
After the working groups have completed their initial consultations, new formats for joint exercises may be developed.
Looking ahead, France intends to prepare the necessary infrastructure for the rapid deployment and forward deployment of its airborne nuclear forces across Europe in the event of a crisis. This includes identifying air bases on allied countries and determining how French nuclear units will work with local forces.
Germany is considered a primary partner in this effort. Other countries mentioned include Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden and Denmark.
A joint statement issued with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz confirmed that Germany will participate in French nuclear exercises this year. German fighter jets are expected to practice escorting French Rafale aircraft during these drills.
Additional measures could include the deployment of air and missile defense systems designed to protect French nuclear forces while operating abroad. Paris has proposed developing a joint missile attack warning system, possibly relying heavily on French technology.
Whether these plans will materialize remains uncertain. Essentially, France is proposing something loosely similar to NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, albeit on a smaller scale and with a stronger emphasis on advanced technology.
Macron has emphasized that these initiatives are not intended to replace NATO’s existing and largely American nuclear guarantees. Washington has been informed of the discussions, although the negative response from the United States is not surprising.
As Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov noted this week, the fact that France and Germany are discussing nuclear cooperation shows that talks on strategic stability are no longer just between Moscow and Washington.
The geographic expansion of Western nuclear infrastructure across Europe – especially to countries like Sweden, Denmark and Poland – inevitably raises concerns in Moscow. These areas are much closer to Russia’s borders than where American nuclear bombs have been deployed in the past.
However, there is a mitigating factor. Large-scale pan-European military plans have a long history of ambitious declarations and a short history of successful implementation.
For now, France’s nuclear ambitions fall into that familiar category.
This article was first published on Kommersant and was translated and edited by the RT team.
