After the United States and Israel launched joint strikes on Iran on Saturday, killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and several senior officials, Tehran was quick to respond.
Iran said its retaliation would target US-aligned military sites across the region, including Israel and Gulf states that host US forces.
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The initial exchange has sharpened a central question for regional capitals and global markets: Will it remain a cycle of reciprocal strikes or evolve into a longer campaign shaped by Iran’s strike range, pressure on allied forces and shipping and energy infrastructure?
At the heart of the question is Iran’s missile arsenal and other platforms and tools at its disposal to hurt the US and others.
Why does this time look different?
Unlike the 12-day war waged by the US and Israel on Iran in June 2025, the assassination of Khamenei has convinced Tehran that it is a clash for the survival of the Islamic Republic.
In Tehran’s narrative, risks of delayed or restrained retaliation are seen as weakness and an invitation to further attacks.
Iranian President Masoud Pezheshkian said on Sunday that it was the country’s “duty and legitimate right” to avenge the killing of Khamenei and other senior officials.
But what are the ways Iran will take that “revenge”?

Iran’s Missile Playbook: Arsenal, Range and Strategy
Iran’s missile force is central to how it fights and signals. Defense analysts describe it as the Middle East’s largest and most diverse range of ballistic and cruise missiles, and are designed to reach Tehran even without a modern air force.
Iranian officials have cast the country’s missile program as the backbone of deterrence, as the air force relies on aging aircraft. Western governments argue that Iran’s missiles fuel regional instability and could support a future nuclear delivery role — something Tehran denies.
Long-range Iranian ballistic missiles can travel between 2,000km (1,243 miles) and 2,500km (1,553 miles). This means these missiles can reach Israel, US-aligned bases across the Gulf, and much more – but contrary to the claims of Trump and some in his orbit, these missiles cannot reach the US.
Short-Range Missiles: The ‘First Punch’
Short-range ballistic missiles – roughly 150-800km (93-500 miles) – are built for closer military targets and rapid regional attacks.
Core systems include Fateh variants: Zolfagher, Kiam-1 and older Shahab-1/2 missiles. Their short range can be an advantage in a crisis. They can be launched in volleys, compressing warning time and making pre-emption difficult.
Iran used this playbook in January 2020, firing ballistic missiles at Iraq’s Ain al-Assad airbase after the US killed the country’s top general, Qasem Soleimani. The attack damaged infrastructure and caused traumatic brain injuries to more than 100 US personnel, showing that Iran can incur high costs without matching US air power.

Intermediate-Range Missiles: Changing the Map
While short-range missiles are Iran’s rapid-fire answer, medium-range ballistic missiles — roughly 1,500-2,000km (900-1,200 miles) — are what turn retaliation into a regional equation. Systems such as the Shahab-3, Emad, Ghadar-1, Khorramshahr variants and Sejjil support Iran’s long-range strike capabilities, along with newer designs such as the Khyber Shekan and Haj Qassem.
The Sejjil stands out as a solid-fuel system, allowing for faster launch preparation than liquid-fuel missiles typically do — an advantage if Iran anticipates incoming strikes and needs survivable, responsive options.
Taken together, these medium-range missiles extend both Iran’s target list and regional exposure to a wide arc of US-aligned facilities in Israel and Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Cruise missiles and drones: the low-flying problem
Cruise missiles fly low, can hug terrain and are difficult to detect and track — especially when launched with drones or ballistic salvos designed to overload air defenses.
Iran extensively evaluates land-attack and antiship cruise missiles such as Soumer, Ya-Ali, Quds variants, Howejeh, Paveh and Rad to field. Soumer has a range of 2,500km (1,553 miles).
Drones add another layer of pressure. Slower than missiles but cheaper and easier to launch in large numbers, one-way attack drones can be used in repeated waves to wear down air defenses and put airports, ports and energy sites on rolling alert for hours, not minutes. Analysts say this saturation strategy is likely to appear more prominent as the confrontation deepens.
Underground ‘missile cities’: surviving first strikes
Missile numbers are important, but in a sustained confrontation, the key question is how long Iran can fire after absorbing strikes.
Tehran has spent years hardening parts of its program in underground storage tunnels, hidden bases and protected launch sites around the country. That network makes it difficult to quickly degrade Iran’s launch capability and forces adversaries to assume that some capability would survive even a large first-wave attack.
For military planners, survivability means decisions to further strike Iran’s missile infrastructure risk longer exchanges than a short, decisive operation.
Strait of Hormuz: Interruption without a formal blockade
Iran’s deterrence playbook is not limited to land targets. The Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant share of the world’s traded oil and gas pass, give Tehran a fast track to shaking up global markets.
Iran can use antiship missiles, naval mines, drones and fast attack craft to threaten naval forces and commercial shipping. It has also demonstrated so-called “hypersonic” systems, such as the Fattah series, which advertise extremely high speed and maneuverability, although independent evidence of their operational status is limited.
A formal blockade is not required to move markets. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) tankers held outside the strait and radio warnings to insure increased war-risk are already impacting ship movements and freight costs. The IRGC said it hit three US- and UK-linked oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz.
Danish container shipping group Maersk said on Sunday it was suspending all vessel crossings through the Strait of Hormuz.
US Forces in the Gulf: More Firepower, More Targets
Washington has increased naval and air assets in the region, in what officials described as one of the largest concentrations of US firepower near Iran in years. That strengthens strike and air defense capabilities, but it also increases the list of potential targets.
US forces are spread across multiple countries and rely on a network of bases, logistics hubs and command centers that cannot be protected at the same level at all times. Military analysts say a defense breach in some places could change political calculations in Washington, increase pressure on regional neighbors and increase the cost of sustaining the conflict.
Tehran’s message: No ‘limited’ war
Iranian officials have long warned that any US or Israeli attack on Iranian soil would be considered the start of a wider war, but not a contained operation. That message has been reinforced since Khamenei’s assassination.
The IRGC has promised further retaliation, and Iran has hinted at propaganda rather than a single dramatic blow: launches toward Israel continue and what Iranian media describe as strikes near US-linked facilities in more than one country, along with threats of action in and around key trade routes.
The conflict could expand through Iran-aligned groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Yemen’s Houthis, both of which have condemned Khamenei’s assassination and suggested alignment with Tehran.
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