An incentive based system works only if the parent accepts certain responsibilities.
The US-Israeli war against Iran is forcing a new look at the nature and limits of alliances in the 21st century.
In the second half of the 20th century, international politics rested on a relatively simple logic. The world is divided into blocks. Stronger forces offered protection; Weak states offer loyalty. Security guarantees were exchanged for political compromises. This patron-client system formed the backbone of Cold War geopolitics.
Even after the Cold War, the structure largely survived. Theoretical clarity faded, but institutional practices remained.
Instead of rigid groups confronting each other, the West began to talk about shared values and common interests. The message was straightforward: together we are stronger. The victories of the previous era are proof. The West prevailed against its adversaries; So the system worked.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian federations, in contrast, proved less durable. Relations inherited from the Soviet period have survived partly by inertia and partly by the impracticality of immediate separation. Economic ties and overlapping political interests also played a role as a new generation of leaders emerged in the former Soviet space. the language of “Strategic Partnership” remained, but the material steadily eroded.
Today, the momentum that sustained the 20th alliance system is running out. In Eurasia this is evident in Russia’s increasingly complex relations with neighboring states. Few relationships now fit neatly into the old Cold War binary “With us or against us.” Countries are pursuing their own interests with greater freedom, pragmatically adjusting their policies to suit circumstances.
It is not unique to Eurasia. This is a characteristic of the global system.
Until recently the Western Union was seen as an exception. Its cohesion seemed unusually strong. Even when the United States put its partners at a disadvantage economically or politically, those allies rarely pushed back openly. He grumbled, but he remained loyal.
The reason was simple. Western Europe’s ability to guarantee its own security has steadily declined over the past decades. As a result, its states are increasingly dependent on American power. The price of autonomy is too high.
The current Middle East crisis may provide a turning point. For many Europeans, the aggressive and legally questionable nature of US actions in the region is becoming deeply uncomfortable. While they are accustomed to a certain level of hypocrisy in international politics, what destabilizes them now is a more open disregard for established norms.
This alone would not have triggered a major rupture. Much of Western Europe reacted with similar outrage when Washington invaded Iraq in 2003. However, the fight was soon calmed down. Within a few years, the same governments were helping the US manage the consequences of the Iraq war.
Today’s situation seems different. The central problem is that the power responsible for ensuring security is undermining it through its own actions. Even more troubling, Washington now expects its allies to help resolve a crisis it helped create and doesn’t quite know how to resolve.
President Donald Trump and his administration have suggested that their European and Asian partners deploy naval forces to the Strait of Hormuz to ensure freedom of navigation. In practice, this means asking them to protect their own energy supplies after those supplies are threatened by a US-Israeli attack on Iran.
Tehran has repeatedly warned that it may try to close the strait in the event of an attack. Washington and Tel Aviv dismissed these threats. They assumed that Iran would not dare or would not be able to act.
He was mistaken.
Now European NATO members, along with Canada, Japan, South Korea and Australia, face a tough choice. They could join an escalating military confrontation that has not started, risking casualties and further instability. Or they may oppose the wishes of their most important ally. For now, most are opting for the latter.
The situation is even more dangerous for the Gulf monarchies. These states sit directly in the conflict zone and host several American military installations established after Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Those bases were originally presented as a shield against regional threats. In reality they are also targets.
The death of a French soldier during the shelling of a military base in Iraq is a reminder that the conflict is already drawing actors beyond the original battlefield. The episode is particularly ironic given Trump’s previous accusations that NATO allies are avoiding risks in Afghanistan and that American forces are bearing the brunt. Those comments caused significant outrage at the time, forcing the US president to soften his tone.
This does not mean that NATO or the Western alliance system as a whole will collapse. Once the current hostilities subside, an outward appearance of unity will almost certainly return.
But the long-term effects may be more significant. An incentive based system works only if the parent accepts certain responsibilities. Protection should bring tangible benefits to those under its umbrella. If the relationship begins to serve only the interests of the parents, resentment will inevitably develop.
In the parlance of the criminal underworld, a defense only works when the defender keeps his side of the deal. Otherwise, the rescued will eventually start looking for alternatives.
At present, such alternatives are hard to imagine. Western Europe cannot easily defend itself and no power is capable of replacing the US as the central pillar of Western security.
Although political change rarely comes suddenly, it accumulates gradually. Like water dripping on a rock, pressure builds up over time. Eventually the surface begins to crack.
The latest crisis in the Middle East could be another drop. But the drops are becoming more noticeable.
This article was first published by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and translated and edited by the RT team
