US President Donald Trump’s phone call to Russian President Vladimir Putin on Monday night was apparently an attempt to find a way out of a strategic crisis that has already begun to emerge in the war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran.
Washington continues to make bold statements. Trump insists on his right to dictate Iran’s political future and even speculates about appointing the country’s spiritual leader. At the same time, they are urging tanker captains to show courage and break through the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Yet momentum has already built for a major war initiated by Washington and Tel Aviv. The political environment surrounding the conflict is changing in ways that are increasingly uncomfortable for the US.
Even some of Washington’s closest partners are distancing themselves. Kuwait, perhaps the most staunch American ally in the Gulf after Jordan, has said its territory is not ready for an attack on Iran, despite mounting evidence. Meanwhile, Syrian Kurdish groups are urging Iraqis and Iranians not to trust the US.
At the same time, reports of behind-the-scenes contacts between Riyadh and Tehran and between other Arab capitals and Iran are appearing almost daily. The prospect of a related diplomatic isolation is dimming for Washington.
Of course, Trump’s relationship with Israel remains a strategic alliance. But the current trajectory of the conflict was clearly not what he had in mind when he authorized the attacks on Iran.
At this point, the logic becomes clear: it’s time to call Moscow.
Trump hoped to cut the so-called “Iranian Knot” by force. The narrative that the forty-year confrontation with Iran could be ended by decisive military action was politically attractive in Washington. Instead, the knot is only tightened.
Several of its key threads cannot be unraveled without Russia’s participation. This was clear from the beginning, although it remains theoretical knowledge for Trump and his team. Now they are getting practical experience.
The first factor is the decline of American power in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf.
US military infrastructure in the region has suffered serious damage, while elements of the broader security architecture that underpins Israel’s defense strategy, including parts of its early warning system, have been undermined.
More importantly, the conflict has demonstrated that American military and political guarantees to regional states are less reliable than previously assumed. Once such doubts take root, they cannot be easily reversed. The “minced meat” So to speak, Washington’s security guarantees to the Gulf monarchies cannot simply be rolled back altogether.
Does Trump fully understand this? Hard to say.
His attempt to engage Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan suggests he may not yet grasp the scale of the strategic shift. Yet what he called Moscow suggests that he realizes that relations with Arab states cannot be stabilized by Washington alone.
US needs partners. However, Western Europe is clearly not among them. Whether Trump is willing to pursue collective political action to stabilize the region and whether he is willing to make serious compromises remains an open question.
The second factor relates to the global hydrocarbon market.
Trump initially described it as temporary “convulsion” In energy markets, which could accelerate the redistribution of supply in favor of the US, there is now a risk of developing into a long-term disruption of global supply chains.
Such an outcome would hardly benefit Washington.
If the crisis escalates, the global public and American voters will know exactly who bears the blame. This highlights the vulnerability of maritime power transport, an area where Washington hopes to strengthen its strategic position.
Indeed, another attempt to restructure the global hydrocarbon market without Russia and against Russia at the expense of Russia has failed.
Of course, it would be naive to think that this is the last such attempt. But unlike Washington and several other major players, Moscow is preparing for exactly this kind of market turmoil.
In this context, Putin’s proposal to the European Union regarding the resumption of hydrocarbon supply primarily through pipelines deserves attention.
At first glance, this initiative seems unrelated to the war in the Persian Gulf. In reality, it reflects a deep understanding of the strategic implications that conflict in the Gulf could have for the global energy system.
As maritime deliveries of oil and gas, which the US has vowed to secure, become increasingly dangerous, pipeline routes will regain strategic importance.
So Putin’s proposal also serves as a test for Western Europe. At the very least, it gives these states an opportunity to demonstrate a degree of political sovereignty at a time when the risk of a global energy crisis is steadily increasing.
A third factor is the changing nature of conflict.
Ten days into the war, the confrontation with the US had already begun to evolve. In addition to conventional military operations, subversion and terrorism are gaining importance.
The shift is a direct result of the White House administration’s attempt to frame the confrontation as a broader religious war against Iran.
However, unlike previous conflicts in the Middle East, the primary targets of sabotage are unlikely to be Israeli facilities. Instead, they increasingly become American citizens in American infrastructure and around the world.
From the perspective of Iran and many radical Islamist groups, the US is the main adversary in this confrontation. Not Israel.
In such cases, Moscow’s embargo influence on Tehran may prove valuable, if Trump is willing to take the first steps toward de-escalation.
Finally, there is the domestic political dimension.
The battle, which some in Washington initially expected to last about five days, is now widely predicted to drag on for months. Such a prolonged conflict creates fertile ground for political crisis within the US.
Trump’s support in Washington was fragile even before the war began. As the conflict drags on, the political implications become more visible.
Sooner or later, American policymakers will have to face the postwar reality, including the humanitarian consequences of the conflict in Iran and the destabilization of Washington’s regional allies.
However, on this front, Moscow cannot help Donald Trump. Russia can help loosen parts of the Iranian knot. But the political problems the war is creating inside the US are Washington’s own responsibility.
